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Introduction
Over the past decade, human capital has taken center stage as a determinant of economic growth.
Models of endogenous or exogenous growth emphasize human capital accumulation as an important engine
of growth, if not its primary determinant.  Given the dramatic rises in schooling that accompany economic
growth, it is hard to dispute the emphasis of these models.  However, there have been few attempts to model
the pertinent family-level decisions that influence children’s schooling .  For example, the level and distribution
of skills within a family is determined by fertility rates as well as by parents’ decisions on investment in human
capital and which children should receive these investments.  All of these decisions reflect rates of return to
various activity.  Moreover, these rates of return are influenced by factors that can only be studied in a general
equilibrium setting.  This paper constructs such a model and attempts to shed light on important features of
the development process.  
This paper presents a model economy with overlapping generations of families whose offspring receive
either skilled or unskilled human capital.  Fertility decisions are endogenous, and parents must decide not only
how many children to raise, but also the proportions that will receive each type of human capital.  Child-rearing
requires parental time, which involves sacrificing time at work.  Both skilled and unskilled parents are capable
of raising both types of children, but skilled parents have a comparative advantage in raising skilled children.
Production utilizes inputs of both types of human capital.  The parameters of the model are calibrated to match
certain crucial features of the world economy under different scenarios, and the model is simulated under these
different scenarios.  For certain parameter combinations, the results of the model are broadly consistent with
the histories of developed economies and the world economy as a whole.
Using this framework, we derive predictions from the model economy related to the following
“empirical regularities” of the development process:
1. Human capital (“skill”) expands as per capita income rises.
2. The dispersion in educational attainment (“skill level”) declines.1The exception is France, where the two rates declined concurrently.  See Chesnais (1985).
3. Fertility rates decline.
4. Life expectancy, and the average age of new labor market entrants both increase.
The first reflects the skill deepening and broadening that accompanies the modernization process.  As
Becker (1993) notes, 
It is clear that all countries which have managed persistent growth in income have had large increases in the
education and training of their labor forces.  First, elementary school education becomes universal, then high
school education spreads rapidly, and finally, children from middle-income and poorer families begin going
to college.  (p.  24).
Easterlin (1998) documents the substantial increase in primary enrollment rates for a broad sample of countries
from the end of the 19
th century to the 1990s.  Baier, Dwyer, and Tamura (1999) utilize the data in Mitchell
(1993) to document the increasing proportions of the male population that have been exposed to primary,
secondary, and tertiary education in an even more comprehensive set of countries.  For the U.S., Denison
attributes one-fourth of the rise in per capita income from 1929 to 1992 to increases in the average level of
schooling.
The decline in the dispersion of enrollment rates is evident from Table 0, which again utilizes data from
Mitchell (1993).  In order to summarize the data, individual countries are aggregated into continents or regions,
although the consistent pattern exhibited is a feature of all of the underlying observations, as well.  Although
in earlier years the samples are limited by data availability and therefore estimates for these years tend to be
dominated by a few developed economies, by 1960, the sample is largely complete.  As Table 0 makes clear,
commensurate with the rise in average years of male schooling, each region shows a marked decline in the
dispersion of exposure to primary, secondary, and tertiary education, as measured by the coefficient of
variation.  This illustrates the fact that economic growth and industrialization involve upward skill mobility,
and “specialization” in skill declines.
Declining fertility rates and the demographic transition are a feature of every development experience.  All
developed economies past through a period of declining mortality rates, followed by declining fertility.
1
According to Easterlin (1998), the fertility decline starts in the 1950s and 1960s in most developing economies,
the exception being sub-Saharan Africa, where fertility rates remain high.  While many theoretical models are2Exceptions include Mulligan (1997) who studies endogenous parental altruism, and Behrman, Pollak, and
Taubman (1995).
able to generate a fertility transition, the model presented here allows us to investigate the relationship between
family size and the education opportunities of children.  The literature on the effects of  “sibship” size on the
allocation of time and resources within the family indicates that larger families behave differently than smaller
families, and that birth-order effects may be important, as well (see, for example Behrman and Taubman
(1986), Lindert (1979) for the modern U.S.).  These studies report two major results that are useful in the
assessment of our model: first, when families are larger, each child receives less parental investment, and
second, parents seem to treat their children systematically differently.   In addition, Behrman, et al. (1989) find
that schooling is more unequally distributed in larger families in the U.S.  And, in a study of Philippine rice
villages by Quisumbing (1994), better-endowed parents (in terms of either land or education) treat children
more equitably than do poorer parents.  These results suggest the need to investigate a general equilibrium
model that allows such behavior at the household level.  Among other things, it allows investigation changes
in intergenerational mobility from skilled to unskilled as an economy develops.
Finally, it is well known that as economies develop, they rely less on the labor of children.  For example,
according to ILO data (quoted in Doepke (1999)), in Korea in 1960, 1.1% of children aged zero to fifteen were
economically active, compared with 4.3% in Brazil.  As Korea’s economy developed and human capital
increased, the use of child labor was nearly eliminated: in 1985, .3% of children between ten and fourteen were
active.  As is well know, Brazil’s development experience has not been so fortuitous and in 1990, 24.3% of
ten-to-fourteen-year-olds were still economically active.  Overall .... NEED BROADER STATS (ILO data on
its way.)
Almost all traditional, non-strategic economic analyses of fertility and the effects of altruistic behavior by
parents toward their children imply that identical children will be treated equally.
2  The economic environment
faced by parents influences fertility and child-rearing decisions, but frequently, there is no incentive to treat
children differently (e.g., Becker, et al. (1990)).  Even when this incentive exists, the models are restricted to
impose equal treatment of offspring.  Historically speaking, this may not be an innocuous restriction.  Ample3At its most extreme, this tendency is reflected in the institution of primogeniture, where only the first born
son receives inheritance, or, more generally, unigeniture, where inheritance is passed down to a single heir.
Primogeniture was codified as law in many European societies and their colonies (see Sadler (2000) for examples), and
many great ancient civilizations also adopted the practice among the nobility (see Bergstrom (1995)).  As these
economies grew and resources expanded, equity in inheritances seems to have become the rule.
evidence exists that children have not been treated equally by parents in many societies.
3  It therefore seems
natural to investigate the implication of allowing for this phenomenon in a model of growth and fertility choice.
Without some sort of imperfection in the economic environment, it seems clear that parents would choose
to treat all children identically.  Of course, different ability levels may encourage different levels of parental
transfers in order to maximize productivity.  However, other features of the economic environment are equally
likely to deliver this outcome.  In our model, differential parental transfers can emerge even though children
are ex ante identical.  The particular features of the model that generate this property are a production
nonconvexity in the form of increasing returns to scale in skilled human capital accumulation and closed
financial markets (so that parents cannot borrow against the earnings of future generations).  In such an
environment, when parents care about the average utility of their children, it may no longer desirable to equalize
transfers or other investments across children, especially at lower incomes.  However, as incomes grow,
transfers and investment may become more equal.
The results of the model also add something to the ongoing debate about the relative merits of modeling
growth as due to endogenous or exogenous forces.  Since we use a CES technology, endogenous growth is
possible when the elasticity of substitution between the two factors of production – skilled and unskilled labor
– is high.  When this is not the case, the model will approach a stationary state in the absence of exogenous
technical progress.  In the simulations, we investigate both scenarios, after calibrating the model to match
certain features of the world economy, both past and present.  In order to match these features, it is necessary
that the model economy exhibit growth in per capita incomes, a property that would not be possible with a low
elasticity of substitution.  Thus, under this scenario, we assume that unskilled human capital grows
exogenously.  Since this is the only way that the model can be made to fit the historical data under the low
elasticity of substitution assumption, the different results that emerge between the endogenous and exogenous
growth scenarios allow us to make claims about the reasonableness of these mechanisms for generating growth.
The next section of the paper formally develops the model economy.  In section 3, the model is calibrated4In other words, if there were a type of skilled human capital that had zero Lebesgue measure, that type
would have no effect on production, or consumption or population.  Since this type has no effect on any
measurable economic quantity, we ignore them.
5Death can occur at two possible ages, if a child receives no human capital investment, it can occur
immediately after the rearing time.  If a child receives human capital investment, then the death occurs
immediately after the education.
and simulated and we compare results from different parameter combinations.  Section 4 concludes.
The Model Economy
In this section we present the underlying model of the paper.  Initially. there are two types of agents, those with
skilled human capital and those with unskilled human capital.  The distinction between skilled human capital
and unskilled human capital is quite similar to that contained in Becker, Murphy and Tamura, hereafter BMT,
(1990).  However unlike BMT (1990), unskilled human capital can work with skilled human capital.  In fact
the wage per unit of unskilled human capital is rising the in the level of skilled human capital available in the
economy.
Skilled and unskilled agents have identical preferences.  Among skilled agents there can be many types,
where a type is given by the level of skilled human capital.  Furthermore there are a continuum of agents.  The
Lebesgue measure of unskilled agents we refer to as the population of the unskilled agents.  For each type
among the skilled human capital population there are a positive measure of agents.
4
An agent lives for possibly two periods, young and old.  As in Jones (1999) and Tamura (1999b), we
introduce mortality into the problem.  If a young person lives through the first period, then he or she lives
through their old age with probability one.  However there exists the possibility that he or she will pass away
before they complete their first period of life.  This death occurs immediately after the time a parent spends
rearing and educating the youth.
5
While young an individual receives human capital investment, if any, from his or her parent.   If he or she
survives his or her youth, when an individual is old, he or she chooses own consumption, fertility and the
investments in human capital of his or her children.  A parent does not care about the human capital levels of
his or her children, but rather, only about the incomes of his or her children.  Unlike previous work on
endogenous fertility and endogenous human capital investment, Tamura (1996,1997,1999ab), an agent can6An alternative equilibrium would be one where all identical human capital individuals have the same
utility.
specialize his or her human capital investment on a fraction of his or her children.  Let superscript s refer to
skilled earnings, and superscript u refer to unskilled earnings.  We assume that parents care about the average
number of adult survivors they have.  Finally we assume log preferences for tractability; ignoring individual
subscripts for simplicity:
[ ] ( ) { } a g b ln ln ln ln , c b d s y s y t t t t t
s
t t
u + - + + - + + 1 1 1 (1)
where ", $, ( > 0, 0 # st # 1, and dt is the average number of deaths prior to reaching adulthood and bt is
the number of births a parent has.  We focus on one particular equilibrium.  We assume that all parents with
the same level of skill choose the same actions.  In particular we assume that all identical parents choose the
same fraction of children to invest in skilled human capital.
6
Each individual has the following budget constraint, for the moment we suppress whether earnings are for
skilled or unskilled human capital individuals:
( ) [ ] c y b s t t t t t = - + 1 q t , (2)
where 2 >0 is the fraction of time each child takes to rear, st is the fraction of children receiving skilled human
capital investments, and Jt is the teaching time spent per child receiving skilled human capital.  We assume that
if a child receives no skilled human capital investments, he or she is endowed with h’ units of unskilled human
capital.  Notice that a parent must spend rearing time and education time on all children, regardless of whether
they survive to adulthood.
The skilled human capital accumulation technology has two branches.  The first branch is for parents
without any skilled human capital.  The second branch is for parents with skilled human capital.  We assume
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= max{ }, 0 < n < B < 1, : > 0, 1 > 6 > 0.  The first branch shows that an unskilled parent can ht ht
s7Thus the Lebesgue measure of unskilled agents is Nt and the ebesgue measure of skilled agents of type
j is mjt.
8The capita input is a version of Tamura (1992).
produce skilled human capital.  Since , n < B, relative to a skilled parent, an unskilled parent is less able to
take advantage of the existing body of knowledge, contained in  .  Furthermore even the unskilled parent’s ht
existing stock of unskilled human capital,  , is less productive, 6 < 1, than an equivalent amount of skilled ht
u
human capital,  .  This indicates that the unskilled parent has a comparative advantage in producing ht
s
unskilled children, and thus, ceteris paribus, he or she will have more children than a skilled parent.  Over time
if the body of knowledge in the population rises, then perhaps all unskilled parents will have skilled children.
We assume that unskilled human capital grows exogenously (if at all) over generations at rate, F F $ $ 1.
The final step in setting up the model is to present production.  There is a single consumption good in the
economy.  It is produced under constant returns to scale in the distribution of human capital.  If all human
capital levels, skilled and unskilled, were multiplied by ., total output of the consumption good would also be
multiplied by ..  There is diminishing returns in each individual type of human capital, that will be elaborated
in more detail below.  Assume that the two types of human capital, skilled and unskilled are combined using
the following CES production technology:



































where there are Nt unskilled individuals; Mt types of skilled individuals, there are mjt skilled individuals of type
j, each with hst units of skilled human capital, and  skilled individuals.





of as a standard CES production technology combining labor with a capital input.  The important differences
are that the capital input comes from the distribution of skilled human capital, and that the capital input
demonstrates increasing returns to scale in the number of skilled agents, T>1.
8  To see this, assume that all
skilled agents are identical with ht units of skilled human capital, and the population of skilled agents is M, then
the capital input is given by:K M h t t =
w (5)
This increasing returns in skilled human capital participation will play an important role in determining if
unskilled parents have only skilled children.
Since each individual is a set of measure 0, each agent has no control on his or her wage per unit of human
capital.  Each agent, skilled or unskilled, earns an income that is a product of the wage per unit of human
capital and the amount of human capital they have.  Earnings for an unskilled worker and a skilled worker of
type i are:
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(6)
Since all unskilled agents have the same level of unskilled human capital, all unskilled agents earn the same
income.  Of the skilled agents, the wage per unit of skilled human capital depends on the amount of skilled
human capital an individual has.  Since each agent is a set of measure 0, no agent has any control on the wage
per unit of human capital.  We assume that agents do not form coalitions of measurable size to try and affect
the wage per unit human capital of their type.  Thus we assume that all agents take all wages in the next period
to be independent of their actions.
Unskilled Problem
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The first order conditions for optimal choices of fertility, bt , skilled human capital investment time, Jt , and
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(8)
Notice that the effect of expected deaths causes an increase in the marginal benefit of an additional birth.  It
has no effect on marginal benefit of human capital investment.  However because of the timing of youth deaths,
it raises the cost of human capital investment.  Thus the effect of youth mortality is to increase fertility and
decrease investments.  Whether the reduction in investment occurs via lowering the share of children receiving
investments, and or the lowering of the amount of investment per child receiving investments is unclear.
The first two equations can be solved in terms of the share of children receiving skilled human capital
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Substituting in for ntJt into the final equation in (8) and simplifying produces:





Thus the income gap between a skilled child from an unskilled parent and his or her unskilled sibling from the
same unskilled parent is a constant percentage, approximately equal to :.  Below we will solve for the
specialization rate, st , under perfect foresight, but before we do this we must examine the skilled agent’s10Urban workers had differential mortality compared to rural workers throughout much of human
history, see Diamond (1999).
problem.
Skilled Problem
In this section we solve the problem facing the typical skilled parent.  The appendix shows that if the
unskilled parents are investing in a positive fraction of their children, then all skilled parents are investing in
all of their children.  Furthermore the appendix shows the condition necessary for all skilled parents to invest
in their children, even when unskilled parents are producing no skilled children.
Suppose the conditions in the appendix hold so that all skilled parents invest in all of their children. The
problem facing a skilled parent becomes:
( )
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Observe that the expected number of deaths facing a skilled parent can differ from the expected number of
deaths facing an unskilled parent.
10  As before, the effect of youth mortality is to raise the number of births and
lower the amount of investment per child.  Since we are focusing on the case where all skilled parents invest
in all of their children, we can unambiguously predict that mortality will lower the amount of human capital
investments per child.
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Since each skilled parent faces the same expected number of deaths, observe that fertility and human capital
investment time is independent of the level of skill an individual has.  Furthermore notice that if an unskilled
parent invests in all his of her children in (9), then he or she will have identical fertility and identical
investments per child as a skilled parent only if the mortality is the same.  As a consequence of (13) and (9),
it is clear that unskilled parents will have higher fertility than skilled parents.  Furthermore unskilled parents
will invest less per child than a skilled parent invests per child.  
Finally since all skilled parents invest the same amount of time per child, all skilled individuals converge
to the same human capital level, as in Tamura (1991).  Thus the turnpike theorem holds in this model.  The














































If all unskilled human capital individuals eventually produce only skilled human capital individuals, then all
individuals will become identical in the long run.
The long run behavior of the model is given by the solution to (13) when dt converges to 0.  Solving for















It is quite possible for their to exist branches of dynasties that remain unskilled forever.  In particular,
given the production function, if D # 0, then both skilled and unskilled individuals are essential factors ofproduction.  If both types are essential then there could be a stationary state of constant flow of new skilled
workers, i.e., some children of unskilled parents will forever become skilled, while all skilled parents produce
skilled workers.  We present both phenomena below in the numerical solutions.
The Appendix presents the sufficient condition for all skilled parents to raise only skilled children.
Furthermore Appendix B presents the sufficient condition for endogenous growth.  As in Barro and Sala-i-
Martin (1995), endogenous growth is only possible if D > 0.  However D > 0 is a necessary condition, but it
is not sufficient.  Endogenous growth requires that the skilled capital aggregate must grow at a sufficiently fast
rate to “pull” the unskilled workers into the skilled population.  Essentially the skilled capital aggregate must
grow faster than the population growth rate of unskilled workers.  In the terminology of the neoclassical growth
models, capital accumulation must be more rapid than the population growth rate, i.e., capital deepening must
occur.
Numerical Solutions
In this section we detail the numerical solution of the model for various parameter values.  We examine
several cases.  In particular we chose three different values of D, D = -2.5, -1.25, .525.  As we varied D, we
varied the rate of exogenous technological progress for unskilled workers.  We did this in order to maintain a
constant average growth rate of income per capita.  The parameters of the simulations were adjusted to
match world population in the year 1800 of around 1 billion and in the year 2000 of 6 billion, and per
capita income of skilled workers at roughly $30,000.  Certain parameters are held constant in the four
simulations.  The values of the these parameters are " " = .395, $ $ = 5.1, ( ( = .4775, 2 2 = .25, : : = .05 , A =
2, and B B = .5.  The values of T T, F F, n n, and 6 6 are adjusted in order to maintain the consistency of the data
with historical reality under each scenario.  The values of these parameters are listed at the top of each
panel of Figure 1.
The number of state variables in this problem varies over time.  The economy is characterized by the
human capital distribution.  It is necessary to know the level of unskilled human capital at time t,   , and the ht
u
population of unskilled individuals, Nt and the distribution of skilled human capital at time t,






s11See, for example, the cross-country study of occupational mobility by Erikson and Goldthorpe
(1992).  Evidence on earnings and occupation mobility that supports our assumption can be found in
Zimmerman (1992) for the U.S. and Chechi, Ichino, and Rustichini (1999) for Italy and the U.S.
population skilled group j, and Mt is the number of groups of skilled human capital at time t.  Information on
all of these variables completely characterizes the economy at time t.  The equilibrium we considered was one
in which skilled parents only raised skilled children.  Although clearly an approximation, there is ample
empricial justification for this assumption.  Mobility studies verify that upward mobility is much more
likely that downward mobility in industrialized and industrializing countries.
11  When combined with the
observation that the process of industrialization entails upgrading the skill level of all occupations, we
reach the conclusion that downward mobility is a rare occurrence, a conclusion we should note that is
consistent with our view that  the development process can be reasonable characterized as a process of
overcoming nonconvexities in production opportunities while faced with imperfect (or closed) financial
markets.
Under this equilibrium, the actions of the skilled parents are simple to characterize.  Their fertility and
human capital investment time are identical, no matter the level of skill any skilled parent has.  These policy
functions are given by (13).  Having solved for the policy functions for all skilled parents, the only thing left
to solve are the policy functions of the unskilled parents.  Recall that all unskilled parents in period t have
units of unskilled human capital.  The growth rate of these units is assumed exogenous and equal to 8u $ ht
u
1.  The policy functions for fertility and human capital investment time, as functions of the share of children
receiving investments, are given by (9).  Therefore the only numerical problem to be solved is the share of
children from unskilled parents that receive investments.  The equation determining this is given by (10).  Using
the results from (13) and (9) and substituting into (10) yields the following implicit function for st :
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of children receiving investments (given by (9)), then
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can be solved numerically to determine the optimal share of unskilled children receiving investments.  Once st
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The first line of (18) updates the unskilled human capital level.  If there is exogenous technological progress,then the unskilled human capital level rises.  The second line of (18) updates the number of unskilled
individuals in the population.  The unskilled population rises or falls if the gross growth rate of population, nt
rises enough to offset those that become skilled st.  The third line of (18) is the law of motion of all skilled
children from skilled parents.  Since all skilled parents choose the same fertility and the same amount of time
to invest in their children, the law of motion for this group is quite simple.  Observe that the existence of the
human capital spillover in the accumulation technology induces human capital convergence.  The fourth line
of (18) gives the human capital of the first generation of skilled children from unskilled parents.  The number
of new skilled workers is given by the fifth line of (18).  Finally the evolution of the number of skilled human
capital types is given by the last line of (18).
The four panels of Table 1 contain the results from these solutions.  Each panel covers one of the four
different parameter sets.  The first column gives the  simulated year.  The second column lists the average
income in the world.  The third column contains the average income of the skilled population, where we average
over all individuals who received skilled human capital from their parent.  The fourth column contains the
average income of the unskilled population.  The final three columns are the population of  skilled individuals,
the population of unskilled individuals and world population.  
The four different panels of Table 1 produce markedly different results.  In the first panel, D = .55, income
growth occurs for both types of individuals.  Income grows for the skilled because population is rising and
because skilled human capital is rising.  For unskilled individuals, their income rises because of the rising
capital contribution in the economy provided by the skilled workers.  Notice that the population of unskilled
workers peaks in 1960 with a population of 3580 million.  By 2000 the unskilled population is reduced to 2510
million, and a minority of the world’s 6030 million population.  World population growth slows dramatically
as the world becomes more and more skill dominated.  The dip in per capita income of the skilled that occurs
in 2000 arises because of the initial creation of skilled individuals by unskilled parents.  The old skilled
population in 1960 is 48 million.  In 2000 the old skilled population is 51 million original skilled descendants
and 820 million newly skilled.  They are less skilled than their skilled counterparts; the original skilled workers
have 1.12 units of skilled capital and the newly skilled have only .000556 units of skilled capital.  However
by the next generation the skill levels of their descendants are 2.1 and .046 and the skill levels of their
grandchildren are 3.95 and .59.  So from .05 percent of incomes, the next generation rises to 2.2 percent andthe grandchildren are at 14.9 percent.  The great-grandchildren have 7.4 and 2.9 units of skilled capital and
the relative income is 39 percent.
This parameterization produces compete exodus of unskilled workers into the skilled worker category.
When this occurs the model becomes like Tamura (1999ab).  Long run balanced growth per capita income

































This is the long run growth rate in this economy, but this rate will not be reached until the year 2360.
Observe that the world population growth slows tremendously after 2000.  By 2200, the world population
grew by only 2.6 percent over the previous 40 years.  Thus while population growth is positive, the model
indicates that world population growth rates never return to the level attained over the 1800 to 2000 period.
Essentially the entire world enters into a demographic transition, moving from unskilled to skilled.  Since the
entire world becomes skilled, it is obvious that the share of the economic pie produced by the skilled population
is 100 percent.
The next panel, D = .25 illustrates a scenario with continuous rapid world population growth.  Population
grows at a 1.18 percent annual rate from 2160 to 2200, compared with the .07 percent annual rate in the
previous solution.  Notice that the annual world population growth is above the rate of population growth
from 1800 to 2000 of .84 percent. [REWORD]  Thus the world never enters into a demographic transition
and the population of unskilled workers rises perpetually.  In the long run the model produces the interesting
result that half the world’s population is skilled and the other half remains unskilled.  This stationary
distribution is interesting because it requires that in every generation each unskilled parent invests in a constant
proportion of his or her children.  Since population growth is faster in this model, average per capita income
growth is slower than per capita income growth of the skilled workers.  Thus the relative earnings of skilled
workers rises compared to unskilled workers.  Unskilled worker income growth is completely driven by the
rising level of capital input provided by the skilled workers.  The share of world output produced by skilled
workers rises from about 36 percent to about 100 percent by the end of the solution in year 7800.  This is
obvious since they are half the world’s population, but their average income grows at a faster rate than thepoor.
In both Table 1a and Table 1b, the solutions are able to match the world population in 1800 and 2000 as
well as the average income in the world in 2000.  However they have different predictions concerning the long
run population growth rate in the world.  By year 7800, the end of the solution, D = .55 produces an
annualized population growth rate of .05 percent.  For D = .25, the annualized population growth rate is .96
percent.
The final two panels of Table 1 provide the results when D < 0.  In each of these cases the value of D
implies that both factors of production are essential.  Hence it is not possible for all unskilled workers to
produce only skilled progeny.  However the cases produce two different population scenarios.  For D = -.5, the
world initially engages in a demographic transition, and almost all children of unskilled parents becomes skilled.
Interestingly the world in 1800 is about 50 percent unskilled.  In 1840, only 3.7 percent of the population is
unskilled.  However this undershoots the long term fraction of the world’s population that will remain unskilled,
which asymptotes to 100 percent!  Thus the model predicts that the Malthusian portion of the world, where
Malthusian implies low skill and high population growth, becomes the entire world.
Table 1c has a different prediction in terms of income.  Per capita income growth occurs for both the
skilled and the unskilled.  However, not surprisingly, the growth rate of income of the skilled exceeds the
growth rate of the unskilled.  Unskilled worker income rises because the capital component provided by the
skilled workers is rising and because there is exogenous growth among the unskilled workers.  The share of
the world output produced by the skilled falls from 92 percent in 1800 to 0 by the end of the solution in year
7800.
Table 1d presents the results for D = -1.7.  Notice that world population is growing without bound as in
the case for D = .25.  Here however world population grows at a faster rate than for D = .25, because the
unskilled share of the population is rising and not constant at half.  In fact the unskilled population essentially
becomes the entire world population.  The share of the world output produced by the skilled population rises
initially from 54 percent in 1800 to 65 percent in 1920.  After 2400 the share of output produced by the skilled
population falls below 80 percent and trends downward forever.  There are occasional blips upward when
unskilled parents produce skilled children.
The population histories produced by D = -.5 and D = -1.7 vary greatly from the case D = .55.  For D =-.5 predicts population growth at tremendous rates.  From a value of 6130 million in 2000, population reaches
181000 million by 2200.  Population growth averages almost 2 percent annually at the end of the solution in
year 7800.  With D = -1.7, the long run population growth rate is similar to that obtained under D = -.5.  By
the end of the sample, population growth averages almost 2 percent annually.
Table 2 produces the time series for the relative importance of the skilled population both in terms of
relative economic production and relative population.  The skilled share of the world’s population attains three
possible values for these 4 cases.  In the first case, D = .55, the model shows that all unskilled eventually
choose to raise only skilled children by year 2600.  For D = .25, the model produces something like a stationary
skilled share of the world’s population.  This stationary value appears to be 50 percent.  For both negative
values of D, the skilled share of the world’s population goes to 0 by the end of the solution.  For D > 0, the
skilled share of GDP goes to 100 percent by the end of the solution.  For D = .55, 2600 the entire population
is skilled.  For D < 0, the skilled share of GDP goes to 0 by the end of the sample (actually to 2.2 percent in
the case of D = -1.7).
Table 3 provides more information from these solutions.  The four panels contain information concerning
the average years of schooling in the population, the average total fertility rate in the world, as well as the total
fertility rates for skilled and unskilled parents, and life expectancy of skilled, unskilled and the world as a
whole.  Recall that each period is 40 years, so that the maximum life expectation is 80.  To calculate life
expectation for the progeny of parents, we use the following values for skilled parents and unskilled parents:
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There are interesting differences between the four sets of solutions.  In the cases where D < 0, the long run
stationary world total fertility rate, TFR, is around 4.33 children.  This accounts for the rapid population
growth.  While life expectancy hits its theoretical maximum in all four of the cases, when D < 0, age at entry
into the labor force, essentially education + 6 or 40(2 + J), is 10.  Thus by the measures of primary schooling,
the typical worker has only 4 years of schooling.  In contrast, for D > 0, the world TFR falls well below 4.33,
at 2.04 for D = .55 and 3.09 for D = .25.  In both of these cases the world TFR is an average of the total12Where in the case of D = .55, there is only one type, skilled workers.
fertility rates of each type.
12  Life expectancy rises to it theoretical maximum, but the second difference is in
the age at entry into the labor force.  Observe that for D > 0, the age at entry is significantly above 10.  It rises
to 21.5 for D = .55 and 15 for D = .25.  Thus in the case of D = .55, the average individual is a college
graduate, whereas for D = .25, the average individual completes primary school or about 9 years of schooling.
This difference in total fertility rates and the age at entry into the labor force appears to be the most useful
way in which to compare these solutions with the world history.  Table 4 contains the information from Baier,
Dwyer and Tamura (1999).  The data shows the fraction of the world labor force that has had no education,
the fraction of workers with some exposure to primary education (but no secondary schooling), the fraction
of workers with some exposure to secondary education (but no higher education) and the fraction of workers
with some exposure to higher education.  The underlying data come from B. R. Mitchell (1993).  While the
data is not completely smooth, this is mostly due to the incorporation of more countries over time.  The sample
of countries is complete by 1960.  Over that shorter period, there has been a monotonic decline in the fraction
of workers with no education at all.  There has been a very slight decline in the fraction of workers with only
exposure to some primary education, from 42 percent to 40 percent.  There has been practically a doubling of
the worker type with some secondary schooling, from 18.6 percent to 36.2 percent.  Finally there has been an
explosion in the share of workers with some higher education exposure, 2.2 percent to 14 percent.  The
calculated average age at finishing education if one calculates the average years of schooling plus 6 to this
sample, is given in the final column of Table 4.  We assigned 0 years of schooling to those with no education
exposure, 3 years of schooling for those with some primary schooling, 10 years of schooling for those with
some secondary schooling and 15 years for those with some higher education.  Since the 1850 data only
contains the United States and the United Kingdom, and these countries lead the way in universal education,
see Goldin (19xx), it is clear that the average age of entry into the labor force has risen by at least 100 percent
over the past 150 years.  This suggests that a model of rising numbers of unskilled workers raising skilled
children better fits the data.
Figures
In this section we present some results of the numerical solutions in graphic form.  We present the shareof the population that are skilled for the four parameter sets.  We also present the share of GDP that is
produced by the skilled population.  Also included are graphs containing log of average per capita income, log
of average skilled per capita income, log of unskilled income.
Figure 1 shows the evolution of the share of total world population that is skilled under the four different
scenarios.  This is the same inormation that was summarized for forty-year intervals in Table 2.  When D =
.55, this share initially decreases, but then rises rapidly, the economy converging to a sitiuation where all
workers are skilled.  Recall that under this scenario, unskilled human capital is not growing over time.  When
combined with the fact that unskilled labor is non-essential to production, we arrive at the conclusion that one
day in the future, all workers will be skilled.  Under the scenario D = .25, however, the skilled share of the
world’s population approaches a value near .5.  Under the other two scenerios, the skilled share of world
population approaches zero.  When D = -.5, this variable first increases, then decreases monotonically.  When
D = -1.70, there is some flucutation during certain time periods, but a monotonic decline for approximately
1500 years.  As can been seen in Figure 6, the periods of fluctuation and monotonicity in the graph in Figure
1 coincide with fluctuations in the rate of transition from skilled to unskilled (e.g., the fraction of children of
unskilled parents who receive skilled human capital investment.  Thus, these are periods where labor-force
fluctuations brought on by parental decisions cause fluctuations in other per-capita magnitutes.
Figure 2 plots the skilled share of world GDP, extending the information in Table 3.  Here, the distinction
between the cases of D > 0 and D < 0 are striking.  In the former case, the share of output produced by skilled
workers monotonically approaches one, although at a slightly lower rate with the lower value of D.
When D < 0, on the other hand, skilled workers eventually account for all of the output produced.  When D =
.05, the decline in the skilled share of output is monotonic, whereas when D = -1.70, this share increases for
two generations, falls monotonically for almost 3000 years, then oscillates as it converges to zero.  As we will
notice below, these oscillations are due to those in the share of unskilled children who receive skilled human
capital.
Figure 3 plots the natural log of average per capita income.  The anomolous result that log per capita
incomes are higher when D = .25 compared with log per capita incomes when D = .55 arises because the
population under the first case is much larger than the population in the second case.  The average level of
skilled human capital is lower in the former case, but this is compensated for by a more rapidly growing skilledpopulation.  In both of these cases, growth is purely endogenous, and in the limit, the growth of unskilled and
average earnings is due to growth in the stock of skilled human capital.  When D < 0, in contast, growth is due
to a combination of this effect and exogenous growth in unskilled human capital.  In fact, without the latter,
the economy would approach a stationary state.  We can see from the figure that the values of the parameters
that were chosen in order to match certain features of the world economy at certain dates imply that the cases
with endogenous growth result in higher per capita incomes, if only from 2040 onwards when D = .25 (see
Table 1).
Figure 4 shows the natural log of average skilled per capita income.  Since the output share of skilled
workers approaches unity so rapidly when D > 0, it should come as no surprise that the series for these cases
should mimic the series for overall average income (Figure 3).  When  D < 0, the series eventually oscillate as
they increase.  These oscillations do not appear in Figure 3 because the skilled share of output is negligable
(Figure 1).  Figure 4 plots this series for unskilled workers.  Note that when D = .55, the series “disappears”
around 3800.  This is due to the fact that there are no more skilled workers in the economy, their measure
having converged to zero.  Here, too, unskilled workers seem to make out better when D > 0 than when D <
0 and unskilled human capital grows exogenously.
Figure 6 shows the fraction of children from unskilled parents who receive skilled human capital
investment.  In effect, it is a child’s probability of upward mobility.  When D > 0, this probablity remains
positive, converging to one when D = .55 and seemingly converging to approximately .23 when D = .25.  When
D < 0, the probablity converges to zero.  The case of D = .55 is perhaps most interesting.  Here, in the initial
generations, there is no mobility.  Then, the value jumps to almost .75 within two generations, declines steadily
and converges to approximately .55.  Then, it jumps discontinuously to one and remains there for the duration.
In this case, the industrial revolution is also a mobility revolution, and as the economy matures, mobility levels
off.  The presence of the second mobility revolution predicted by the model is intruiging.   Once again, the
series oscillates for certain time periods when D = -1.70.  These oscillations are due to fluctuations in the
returns to skilled human capital, as can be seen from Figure 4.
Figure 7 shows a measure of inequality of income, the coefficient of variation of per capita income.  In two
of the cases, a Kuznets-curve pattern emerges, with incquality initially increasing, then converging to zero.
This occurs both when D = .55 and when D = -.50.  When D = -1.70, a similar pattern emerges, albeit withhigher inequality embroidered with the fluctuations that have become familiar for this case by now.  For the
cases with D < 0, inequality converges to zero because all the world’s workers are eventually unskilled (see
Figure), and unskilled agents share equal earnings.  When D > 0, skilled income has a tendency to converge,
(see equation (18)).  The effects of this tendency are most apparent when D = .55.  In this case, we have already
seen that the share of the population that is skilled rapidly approaches one.  Since the entire population is
skilled and skilled incomes converge, inequality approaches zero.  When D = .25, there continues to be mobility
from skilled to unskilled.  Even though skilled earnings converge, the different skill levels and earnings of these
“new entrants” into the skilled labor force keep imply persistent (and even increasing) income inequality.  
Figure 8 plots the coefficient of variation of skilled per capita income.  Again, since in the limit, the entire
population is skilled when D > 0, these series merely mimic those in Figure 7.  With  D <  0, inequality in
skilled per capita income increases and eventually begins to fluctuate, these flucutations become progressively
more severe when D = -.50.Table 0:   Average Years of Schooling and Dispersion of Schooling Exposure By Continent
Europe North America South  Asia & North Africa &  Africa
& Caribbean America Oceana Middle East (exc North)
H CV H CV H CV H CV H CV H CV
1860 1.23 2.35
1870 1.79 1.61
1880 2.19 1.25 7.17 0.16
1890 2.68 0.96 7.63 0.13
1900 3.51 0.66 7.91 0.13
1910 3.87 0.66 6.69 0.74 0.63 3.51 0.64 4.22
1920 4.38 0.54 7.42 0.38 1.54 2.03 1.19 2.97
1930 4.32 0.68 8.11 0.29 2.20 1.61 1.61 2.50
1940 4.99 0.48 8.58 0.39 2.01 1.59 6.42 0.41
1950 5.39 0.46 9.10 0.39 2.94 1.11 2.64 1.81 1.16 2.64
1960 5.99 0.43 9.73 0.33 3.41 0.95 3.31 1.32 1.88 1.72
1970 6.76 0.40 10.28 0.34 4.58 0.66 4.38 0.93 3.19 1.05 3.83 0.85
1980 8.22 0.39 11.13 0.29 5.81 0.53 5.44 0.70 5.12 0.66 4.25 0.67
1990 9.45 0.38 11.78 0.29 7.65 0.35 6.46 0.56 6.73 0.45 5.64 0.47
2000 10.43 0.35 12.28 0.27 8.49 0.30 7.11 0.48 7.86 0.39 5.73 0.49
H – average years of schooling
CV – coefficient of variation in male exposure to primary, secondary, and tertiary education.
Source: Baier, Dwyer, and Tamura (1999) and Table 1a: Average Income, Average Skilled Income and Unskilled Income (in 1990 dollars)
Skilled, Unskilled and Total Population (in millions)














1800 2577 5736 2126 80 712 792
1840 2814 9733 2168 82 1100 1180
1880 3058 16717 2221 84 1730 1820
1920 3369 29560 2299 91 2810 2900
1960 3830 55114 2422 919 3580 4500
2000 6070 11490 3504 3520 2510 6030
2040 57077 67376 16550 6000 931 6930
2080 949269 1015316 93624 7010 380 7400
2120 8037638 8292725 351305 7510 187 7700
2160 3.78e+07 3.85e+07 944836 7830 104 7930
2200 1.23e+08 1.24e+08 2063004 8080 62.4 8140
Table 1b: Average Skilled and Unskilled Earnings and Population













1800 551 2250 388 246 880 1126
1840 847 1232 668 412 1116 1528
1880 1452 3188 918 484 1636 2120
1920 2297 5821 1280 674 2314 2988
1960 3729 10128 1848 978 3278 4252
2000 6366 18286 2772 1484 4564 6040
2040 10814 30056 4221 2292 6340 8640
2080 19753 54446 6751 3588 9040 12640
2120 38422 104067 11347 5900 13220 19120
2160 78650 203419 20008 10140 19840 299802200 170838 419718 37028 17460 30600 48000
Table 1c: Average Income, Average Skilled Income and Unskilled Income (in 1990 dollars)
Skilled, Unskilled and Total Population (in millions)













1800 3 489 .2 162 708 870
1840 241 247 238 321 860 1180
1880 572 629 554 330 1330 1660
1920 1132 1606 1033 352 2100 2450
1960 2085 4076 1800 404 3370 3780
2000 3704 9702 3071 661 5470 6130
2040 6709 13222 5861 1180 9630 10800
2080 12599 24239 11228 2020 18800 20900
2120 23756 45306 21551 3520 38700 42300
2160 44557 87037 40938 6080 80900 87000
2200 82817 166415 76933 10600 170000 181000
Table 1d: Average Income, Average Skilled Income and Unskilled Income (in 1990 dollars)
Skilled, Unskilled and Total Population (in millions)













1800 151 794 77 60.2 659 719
1840 215 2242 62 61.5 1020 1080
1880 288 5117 44 256 1310 1570
1920 425 1494 80 474 1830 2300
1960 887 4186 160 519 3080 3600
2000 2045 13709 433 546 5560 6110
2040 3607 42916 591 2030 8600 10600
2080 5500 17799 1169 4500 14100 18600
2120 10892 39583 2278 5600 29000 346002160 23730 157633 4513 10200 56400 66700
2200 43379 213837 9004 24400 102000 126000
Table 2: Relative Importance of Skilled and Unskilled

















1800 .125 .278 .083 .351 .005 .920 .103 .544
1840 .0854 .295 .322 .462 .320 .328 .070 .731
1880 .0578 .316 .239 .517 .237 .261 .048 .855
1920 .039 .344 .221 .567 .172 .244 .244 .858
1960 .027 .385 .227 .617 .125 .244 .181 .852
2000 .321 .608 .232 .665 .095 .250 .121 .814
2040 .797 .941 .255 .709 .115 .227 .071 .848
2080 .928 .993 .272 .751 .105 .203 .260 .843
2120 .968 .999 .292 .791 .093 .177 .231 .839
2160 .983 1 .319 .827 .078 .153 .125 .834
2200 .990 1 .349 .859 .066 .132 .168 .827
2600 1 1 .436 .987 .010 .025 .132 .764
3000 1 1 .472 .999 .001 .004 .099 .683
3400 1 1 .490 1 0 .001 .069 .584
3800 1 1 .500 1 0 0 .047 .476
4200 1 1 .504 1 0 0 .030 .367
4600 1 1 .506 1 0 0 .054 .263
5000 1 1 .507 1 0 0 .008 .159
7000 1 1 .502 1 0 0 .004 .022Table 3a: Average Education, Life Expectancy and Total Fertility Rates













1800 11.25 44.11 48.95 48.35 4.36 5.45 5.36
1840 10.85 44.15 49.63 49.16 4.27 5.43 5.36
1880 10.58 45.29 50.10 49.82 4.01 5.38 5.33
1920 10.39 48.60 51.15 51.05 3.39 5.28 5.23
1960 10.27 57.47 53.51 53.61 2.40 4.60 4.54
2000 11.37 73.60 56.80 57.12 2.04 3.45 2.67
2040 16.05 79.96 64.92 72.29 2.04 2.86 2.11
2080 19.98 80 76.70 79.62 2.04 2.82 2.07
2120 20.88 80 79.95 80 2.04 2.91 2.06
2160 21.17 80 80 80 2.04 2.97 2.05
2200 21.30 80 80 80 2.04 3.00 2.05
2600 21.46 80 80 80 2.04 3.05 2.04
3000 21.46 80 80 80 2.04 3.05 2.04
3400 21.46 80 80 80 2.04 3.05 2.04
3800 21.46 80 80 80 2.04 2.04 2.04
4200 21.46 80 80 80 2.04 2.04 2.04
4600 21.46 80 80 80 2.04 2.04 2.04
5000 21.46 80 80 80 2.04 2.04 2.04
7000 21.46 80 80 80 2.04 2.04 2.04Table 3b: Average Education, Life Expectancy and Total Fertility Rates













1800 10.83 44.21 47.30 46.96 4.37 5.11 5.05
1840 11.01 43.98 47.76 47.52 4.31 5.45 5.22
1880 12.02 44.78 49.55 48.43 4.12 5.37 5.18
1920 10.68 47.14 50.71 50.31 3.64 5.34 5.07
1960 10.87 53.73 50.96 51.29 2.71 5.30 4.87
2000 11.39 68.24 51.61 53.71 2.06 5.20 4.67
2040 12.04 79.58 52.58 55.84 2.04 5.09 4.51
2080 12.29 80 54.79 58.10 2.04 4.89 4.31
2120 12.48 80 58.54 61.45 2.04 4.60 4.04
2160 12.72 80 64.32 66.51 2.04 4.26 3.73
2200 13.06 80 71.65 72.87 2.04 4.01 3.50
2600 14.18 80 80 80 2.04 3.88 3.25
3000 14.59 80 80 80 2.04 3.85 3.16
3400 14.80 80 80 80 2.04 3.84 3.12
3800 14.91 80 80 80 2.04 3.83 3.10
4200 14.96 80 80 80 2.04 3.83 3.09
4600 14.98 80 80 80 2.04 3.83 3.09
5000 14.99 80 80 80 2.04 3.83 3.08
7000 14.94 80 80 80 2.04 3.83 3.09Table 3c: Average Education, Life Expectancy and Total Fertility Rates













1800 10.05 43.64 46.87 46.84 4.37 5.06 5.06
1840 11.00 43.98 47.52 47.50 4.31 5.45 5.18
1880 12.35 44.78 49.64 48.31 4.12 5.43 5.21
1920 11.70 47.14 50.12 49.21 3.64 5.38 5.17
1960 11.24 53.73 51.20 50.70 2.71 5.27 5.04
2000 10.69 68.24 54.82 55.63 2.06 4.97 4.79
2040 10.87 79.57 59.66 60.41 2.04 4.65 4.47
2080 10.92 80 68.94 69.35 2.04 4.35 4.22
2120 10.82 80 77.76 77.82 2.04 4.3 4.19
2160 10.70 80 79.96 79.96 2.04 4.31 4.22
2200 10.59 80 80 80 2.04 4.32 4.25
2600 10.09 80 80 80 2.04 4.37 4.36
3000 10.01 80 80 80 2.04 4.38 4.38
3400 10 80 80 80 2.04 4.38 4.38
3800 10 80 80 80 2.04 4.38 4.38
4200 10 80 80 80 2.04 4.38 4.38
4600 10 80 80 80 2.04 4.38 4.38
5000 10 80 80 80 2.04 4.38 4.38
7000 10 80 80 80 2.04 4.38 4.38Table 3d: Average Education, Life Expectancy and Total Fertility Rates













1800 11.03 43.53 48.56 48.04 4.37 5.46 5.38
1840 10.70 43.98 49.38 49.00 4.15 5.44 5.38
1880 10.48 46.84 49.87 49.73 3.70 5.11 5.04
1920 10.83 52.92 49.61 49.73 3.07 5.31 4.95
1960 11.58 62.43 52.94 52.94 2.43 5.16 4.87
2000 11.05 73.04 56.64 57.25 2.10 4.93 4.76
2040 10.61 78.99 62.68 63.32 2.04 4.22 4.12
2080 11.52 79.97 70.12 70.39 2.04 4.26 3.90
2120 12.12 80 76.89 77.17 2.04 4.39 4.10
2160 11.40 80 79.58 79.61 2.04 4.12 3.97
2200 11.32 80 79.99 79.99 2.04 4.08 3.87
2600 11.15 80 80 80 2.04 4.21 4.05
3000 10.85 80 80 80 2.04 4.27 4.14
3400 10.59 80 80 80 2.04 4.30 4.22
3800 10.40 80 80 80 2.04 4.33 4.27
4200 10.26 80 80 80 2.04 4.34 4.30
4600 10.32 80 80 80 2.04 4.38 4.32
5000 10.08 80 80 80 2.04 4.37 4.36
7000 10.02 80 80 80 2.04 4.38 4.37Table 4: Historical Education Exposure








1850 .725 .271 .003 .001 6.86
1860 .677 .317 .005 .001 7.02
1870 .572 .419 .007 .001 7.34
1880 .510 .478 .011 .002 7.57
1890 .444 .533 .020 .003 7.84
1900 .297 .665 .033 .005 8.40
1910 .586 .384 .027 .004 8.02
1920 .512 .437 .046 .005 7.85
1930 .484 .439 .069 .008 8.13
1940 .201 .626 .154 .018 9.69
1950 .407 .439 .137 .016 8.93
1960 .374 .419 .186 .022 9.45
1970 .297 .420 .248 .035 10.26
1980 .231 .387 .303 .079 11.38
1990 .144 .400 .335 .121 12.36
2000 .099 .399 .362 .140 12.92year
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Figure 1: Skilled share of the world population D D = .55, D D = .25, D D = -.50, D D = -1.70year
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Figure 2: Skilled share of world GDP, D D = .55, D D = .25, D D = -.50, D D = -1.70year
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Figure 3: Time series of log average per capita income, D D = .55, D D = .25, D D = -.50, D D = -1.70 year
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Figure 4: Time series of log average skilled per capita income, D D = .55, D D = .25, D D = -.50, D D = -1.70year
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Figure 5: Time series of log of unskilled per capita income, D D = .55, D D = .25, D D = -.50, D D = -1.70year
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Figure 6: Fraction of children from unskilled parents receiving skilled human capital investments
D D = .55, D D = .25, D D = -.50, D D = -1.70year
 ycv55  ycv25
 ycv05  ycv17








Figure 7: Time series of coefficient of variation of per capita income, D D = .55, D D = .25, D D = -.50, D D = -1.70year
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Figure 8: Time series of coefficient of variation of skilled per capita income, 
D D = .55, D D = .25, D D = -.50, D D = -1.70Appendix
In this appendix we present the sufficient conditions that simplify the skilled parent’s problem.  Suppose
that all unskilled parents raise skilled children.  Since a skilled parent has higher productivity in human capital
investment than an unskilled parent, clearly his or her children will earn more than the newly skilled children
from an unskilled parent.  Therefore if all unskilled parents invest in all of their children, then all skilled parents
invest in all of their children.
Now consider the case where only a fraction of children of unskilled parents receive human capital
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The first two equations can be solved in terms of the share of children receiving skilled human capital
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(A2)13The left hand side of (A3) will be strictly less than 0 if st=0.
14Obviously if the left hand side of (A3) is negative, then the skilled parent will not choose to invest
in any of his or her children.
Substituting in for ntJt into the final equation in (A2) and simplifying produces:




1 1 0 (A3)
where if (A3) holds as an equality, then there is an interior solution for 1 > st >0.  However if (A3) holds as
a strict inequality, then sit = 1.
13
Assume that all unskilled parents choose to invest in a fraction of their children, but not all of their
children, thus (A3) holds as a strict equality.  
Now examine the problem facing a skilled parent.  If he or she invests in a fraction of his or her children,
the first order conditions are given in (A1).  If he or she chooses to invest in all of his or her children, then (A3)
holds as a strict inequality.  A skilled parent compares the utility from investing in all of his or her children with
the utility from investing in only a fraction of his or her children.  This produces:
( ) ( )
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(A4)
The third line comes from (A3) with equality if a skilled parent invests in only a fraction of his or her children.
14
The fourth line comes from replace s=0 in the denominator of the first term of the third line and s=1 in the third
term of the third line.  Thus a sufficient condition for skilled parents choosing to invest in all of their children
is if the fourth line of (A4) is greater than or equal to 0.  The earnings differential between a skilled child of
a skilled parent (who chooses only skilled children) and the unskilled can be written as:( )




























































Therefore the condition ensuring that skilled parents only raise skilled children becomes:
( )









































































During the numerical solutions we verify that (A6) holds for each generation.
Existence of Endogenous Growth
In this section of the appendix we examine the condition for endogenous growth.  If D # 0, then endogenous
growth is impossible for all agents.  Since unskilled agents are not investing it would take exogenous increases
in their productivity to raise their earnings.  Now consider the case or D > 0.  First examine the case where all

























Given the results in the paper that all skilled agents become identical in their human capital, assume that all




































































endogenous growth will occur in a world of skilled agents.
Now consider the case that there always exists unskilled agents.  Assume that all unskilled agents invest
in some of their children, but not all of their children.  Assume that the share receiving investments is constant
and equal to s.  Assume further that skilled parents increase the level of skilled human capital of their children,






























Earnings growth for skilled and unskilled individuals requires:( ) [ ]
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Let 8N and 8K be the gross growth rates of the unskilled population, N, and the skilled resources, K.  Then the
first term on the right hand side of each equation in () can be written as:
( ) ( )( )
( ) ( )



























Define 8=max{8N , 8K}.  Then the first term approaches the constant value  .  We can rewrite the growth l
r 1-
















































If skilled parents have more than 1 child and increase skilled human capital across the generations, then skilled
earnings grow.  The second equation is clearly the growth bottleneck.  If 8=max{8N , 8K}=8N , then it is clear
that endogenous growth cannot occur for incomes of the unskilled.  Thus the restriction for endogenous growth
to occur becomes:










The term after the equal sign is decreasing in s, so the upper bound on 8 8N is found by letting s approach
zero, yielding
A sufficient condition for endogenous growth is:
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